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ABSTRACT
First established during the 1830's, the Enskilda banks were characterized
by unlimited owner liability and the right to issue bank notes. Consequently,
in Swedish banking history, these banks have been considered to be
primitive relics. This paper utilizes new data to revise this picture of the
Enskilda banks. Applying Douglas W. Diamond’s model (1997) of the
cumulative contribution of banks to the creation of liquid asset markets in
developing economies to the capital poor country of Sweden, indicates that
the Enskilda banks made a contribution out of the reach of non-note issuing
banks. In view of the crucial role of the Enskilda banks, the Banking Act of
1864, which effectively permitted the free establishment of such banks,
must be judged to have been the most important institutional change
facilitating the development of the Swedish credit market.
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Introduction
The fact that the nineteenth century Swedish commercial banking system came to
consist of note issuing private banks, the so called Enskilda banks, was not a matter of
chance. Contemporary observers often noted that Sweden lacked both capital and means
of payment. Sweden being a poor country, and starting in 1834 being committed to a
specie standard, there was no wide spread circulation of means of payment. Today it is
possible to view the early and extensive use of bank notes, private promissary notes and
other IOUs in daily transactions as a sign of financial sophistication. In nineteenth
century Sweden, it was considered to be symbolic of Swedish economic backwardness.
1
                                                
1 The Riksbank’s right to issue one SEK notes was revoked in 1878 in order to promote a more ”civilized
usage of coins”. The Standing Committee on Banking opined that the one SEK notes were a remnant of a
disorganized monetary system and caused the public to believe that notes were actually coins (BaU 1879
No8 p. 3).4
The use of paper and credit money was a result of economic and institutional
circumstances that prevented Swedes from settling their transactions with specie coins.
The right to issue notes had been implemented as a way to finance the banks due to
the lack of trustworthy means of payment and credit.
2 Consequently, the right to issue
notes was seen by contemporaneous actors as a necessary prerequisite for the operation
of a bank.
This nineteenth century banking system has in retrospect been evaluated from an
evolutionary perspective. The presumed ”answer” to how an efficient commercial
banking system should be designed was in terms of the modern system of non-note
issuing Joint Stock banks, not private note issuing banks.
3 Thus, instead of realizing that
the actors of the time had tried to solve their problems in the best way open to them
given the circumstances, the Enskilda banks were simply condemned as symbolic of
Sweden’s primitive banking system.
4 This question of the supposed backwardness of the
Enskilda banks has also been addressed by international scholars.
In 1978 Lars G. Sandberg published his article, ”Banking and Economic Growth in
Sweden Before World War I”. Sandberg argued that the explanation of Swedish
economic success, to a considerable extent, could be found in the early development of
a sophisticated banking system. More generally, the relatively high level of education
that had been achieved despite low income levels, permitted the development of a
banking system well suited to the demands of a growing, credit based, economy.
Indeed, the relative sophistication of the banking system, was a major pillar supporting
Swedish industrialization.
5
Rejecting Sandberg’s argument, Charles P. Kindleberger questioned whether the
mid-nineteenth century Swedish banking system truly could be considered
”sophisticated”. Moreover, he expressed doubt as to the importance of the banking
system in promoting Swedish economic growth at that time. Kindleberger’s scepticism
was largely based on the observation that the Swedish banks participated only modestly
                                                
2 See Ögren, A. (2003a) Chapter 2
3 Apart from the free banking theory, but this makes the anachronistic assumptions of a fully monetized
economy and thus is not applicable on the Swedish case (see Ögren, A. (2003c)).
4 An example of an anachronistic interpretation is the view of Brisman who wrote in the interwar period.
A real and thus effective banking system required a central bank holding monopoly on note issuance,
defending the fixed exchange rate by altering the discount rate, and commercial banks were to be non
note issuing limited liability Joint Stock banks (Brisman, S. (1924), (1931), (1934)).
5 Sandberg, L.G. (1978) pp. 656-6575
in the export activities that generally were taken to be the driving force behind Swedish
industrialization.
6
On the basis of Granger causality analysis, Douglas Fisher and Walter N. Thurman
argued that real Swedish economic growth led to the development of the financial
sector, rather than vice versa. Nonetheless, they concluded that the decreasing velocity
of circulation of means of payment was evidence of an increasingly sophisticated
banking system and thus that Sandberg had a point. Although dubious about how
modern the Swedish banking system actually was before the 1870's, Fisher and
Thurman agreed that the vital breakthrough in Swedish banking came with the
legalization of limited liability Joint Stock banks in 1863.
7
There is disagreement as to exactly when Sweden experienced the birth of modern
banking. Because of its emphasis on deposits, some scholars point to the establishment
of Stockholms Enskilda Bank in 1856.
8 Others emphasize the repeal of the usury law,
with its 6% percent limitation on interest, and the legalization of joint stock banks in
1863.
9 Following in the footsteps of the great guru of Swedish economic history, Eli F.
Heckscher, Kindleberger argued that prior to 1895 the history of Swedish banking was
largely limited to that of the Riksbank, the central bank owned by Parliament.
10
Even though the years chosen might differ, the case for Swedish financial
backwardness is always the same: the absence of a deposit banking system and of liquid
capital markets. The clear implication is that a modern banking system requires Credit
Mobilier type banks, financed by substantial equity capital and deposits, and with joint
stock, limited liability for the owners.
At least during the first half of the nineteenth century, Sweden did indeed lack liquid
capital markets. The most important capital markets, naturally enough, were located in
the two principal cities, Stockholm and Gothenburg.
11 There are theoretical arguments
for the belief that an expanding banking system promotes economic growth. One of
these is that banks can convert illiquid assets into liquid liabilities, thus channeling
                                                
6 Kindleberger, C.P. (1982) pp. 918-920
7 Fisher, D. & Thurman, W.N. (1989) pp. 625, 627-631
8 See Nilsson, G.B. (1981) and Gasslander, O. (1962)
9 Fisher, D. & Thurman, W.N. (1989) p. 625, Sandberg, L.G. (1978) pp. 657, 663. Sandberg divided the
Swedish banking history into an early and a modern period. The latter began in 1864 when joint stock
banking was introduced and the usury law was repealed.
10 Kindleberger, C.P. (1982) pp. 918-919
11 See Lobell, H. (2000).6
capital to activities where demand for it is greatest.
12 Thus, there is reason to believe that
a result of an expanding banking system is the creation of more liquid, and hence more
efficient, capital markets.
13
Since limited liability Joint Stock banks are considered to be the trade mark of a
modern banking system, the Swedish ”Enskilda” banks, characterized by unlimited
owner liability and the right to issue notes, are commonly viewed as banking relics.
They were first established in the early 1830's and they retained the right to issue notes
until the Banking Act of 1897 conferred a note issuance monopoly on the Riksbank,
starting in 1903.
14
The question if the banking system was “modern” or “sophisticated” or not, might be
an anachronistic question based on the view that a banking system has to operate with
deposits or equity capital to finance its business. But, if the Swedish banking system
was modern or sophisticated is really not the question. The more important question is
whether or not the Joint Stock banks truly were more efficient than the Enskilda banks,
and if greater reliance on the former would have been better for Swedish economic
development. This chapter concludes that such would not have been the case.
This chapter uses balance sheet data of the Enskilda banks’ assets and liabilities at
the end of each year from 1834 until 1900 in order to analyze developments over time.
15
The results suggest that the system of Enskilda banks might well have been optimal,
given the institutional setting of the nineteenth century. The introduction of joint stock
banking and the repeal of the usury law were not the most important institutional
changes behind the development of the Swedish credit market. The Act of 1864,
essentially permitting the free establishment of Enskilda banks and the automatic
renewal of their charters, played a greater role. The note issue of the Enskilda banks
                                                
12 See Diamond, D.W. & Dybvig, P.H. (1983) and Diamond, D.W. & Rajan, R.G. (2001).
13 Diamond, D.W. (1997) pp. 949-950
14 For a survey of the Enskilda banks during the period 1834 – 1913, see Ögren, A (2000). Lars Jonung
has argued the case of the Enskilda banks from a strict free banking perspective, see Jonung, L. (1989).
15 These were published in Post & Inrikes Tidning for the years 1834 -1870 and in Sammandrag af
Bankernas Uppgifter for 1871-1906. The years 1835-1846 and 1867-1870 have been supplemented with
data from Sveriges Riksbank (1931) pp. 172-179.
 For 1866, balance sheets as of the end September,
rather than the end of December, have been used. These balance sheets are the only source that include
detailed information of the Enskilda banks’ assets and liabilities for the entire period. The accuracy and
reliability of the figures reported by the banks might be questioned.  When other sources differ from
them, however, other sources than balance sheets are more favorable for the Enskilda banks in terms of
the size of reserves (see BaU 1853/54, Brisman, S. (1924) pp. 246-247, Finanskommittén 1858 and
Sveriges Riksbank (1931) pp. 172-179). After the year 1900 Enskilda bank notes in circulation demised7
contributed substantially to the creation of liquid financial markets and, ironically,
perhaps to creating the conditions needed for deposit based banking.
Enskilda Banks versus Joint stock banks
As noted in the introduction, a previous study of the causal relationship between the
money supply (M2) and real GDP growth in Sweden during the period 1861-1913
concluded that the financial system did not lead growth. On the contrary, it concluded
that real economic growth resulted in expanding financial markets.
16
Nonetheless, the puzzling question as to the relationship between financial and real
economic growth remains unresolved. Of course, most wealthy countries have well
developed financial sectors. Moreover, research indicates that innovative financial
systems are important for economic growth.
17 Thus, there unquestionably is a link
between overall economic performance and the quality of the financial system. This, in
turn, implies that the development of the commercial banking system was of importance
for the growth of the real economy. It thus can be argued that, within the existing
institutional setting, Sweden had an efficient banking system.
If limited liability joint stock banks truly were superior to Enskilda banks, the post
1863 period should have witnessed a decrease in the number of Enskilda banks in
operation and a rapid expansion of joint stock banking. In fact, however, even after joint
stock banking was legalized and interest rate ceilings were abolished, Enskilda banks
continued to be established. Since the Enskilda banks imposed unlimited liability on
their owners, the question becomes why would anyone accept a greater personal risk in
order to found an already outdated bank?
The Establishment of New Banks
During the years 1864 through 1867, no less than fourteen new Enskilda banks were
established, thus demonstrating that this form of banking hardly could have been
                                                                                                                                          
drastically as a response to the coming ending in 1903. Due to the emphasis on the note issuance in this
chapter, this year is chosen as the ending year.
16 Fisher, D. & Thurman, W.N.  (1989) pp. 627-629. Sandberg and Kindleberger, as well as Fisher and
Thurman, all adhere to the Coase theorem: that is that financial systems develop in response to demand
(see also Sandberg, L.G. (1982) pp. 921-922).
17 See Sandberg, L.G. (1978), Petersson, T. (2001) and Sylla, R. (2002). In a recent study on Sweden
1834 – 1991, Hansson and Jonung found evidence for a relation between real economic growth and the
financial sector. Their interpretation of the causality was that the financial system preceded real economic
growth (Hansson, P. & Jonung, L. (2000) pp. 228-230).8
obsolete.
18 A single joint stock bank, the Skandinaviska Kreditaktiebolag was
established in 1864 in Gothenburg, and it did in fact rapidly assume an important
position on the Swedish credit market. Previous to the second wave of joint stock bank
establishments during the late 1890's, however, the only joint stock banks that can be
considered to be commercial banks were established in Stockholm and Gothenburg,
where capital markets already existed.
The joint stock banks that appeared outside these two cities were small, so-called
folkbanks. These were more akin to regional savings than to commercial banks. It was
only during the late 1890's, when a plethora of new banks were established, that the
Enskilda banks ceased to be the primary form of bank. The reason behind this change,
however, was institutional rather than strictly economic. A previously anticipated act
rescinding the Enskilda banks’ right to issue notes was enacted by Parliament in 1897.
19
The increase in the number of joint stock banks was also accelerated by legislation
constraining savings bank behavior passed in 1892. Consequently some savings banks
were converted into (joint stock) folkbanks.
20


























































































Joint Stock banks (incl.
Folkbanks)
Sources: Post & Inrikes Tidning 1835-1871, Sammandrag af Bankernas Uppgifter, 1871-1911, Sveriges
Riksbank (1931) pp.172-185
One piece of evidence used, first by Flux and later by Kindleberger, to argue that the
Enskilda banks were not a successful form of banking is the small number of such
                                                
18 Indeed, the last Enskilda bank was not established until 1893. It was located in Norrbotten, in the far
north of Sweden where business still was suffering from a scarcity of capital.
19 Jonung, L. (1989) p. 38, Ögren, A. (2000) p. 50
20 Sjölander, A. (2000) p. 449
banks established before the mid 1860's. This is taken as a sign that the demand for
Enskilda bank credits was low.
21
The true reason for the small number of new banks, however, was institutional in
nature. The Crown and influential groups in the Parliament had more to gain from
preventing a massive establishment of banks. Previous to 1864, the Enskilda banks were
required to obtain royal charters that were limited to ten years duration. At the end of
that time, the bank had to close its operations and reapply. This procedure prevented the
large scale establishment of Enskilda banks. Not surprisingly, large groups within
Parliament came to dislike Enskilda banks and acted to inhibit the establishment of such
additional Enskilda banks. It also explains why the Banking Act of 1864, which granted
virtually total freedom to establish Enskilda banks, was so important.
22
Many of the Enskilda banks that were established during the late 1860's were former
so-called ”filial banks”. These were a form of limited liability bank operating on the
basis of credits from the Riksbank. When this form of banking was ended in 1862,
virtually all of these filial banks were converted into Enskilda, not joint stock, banks. As
shown in Figure 3.2, throughout the nineteenth century the Enskilda banks as a group
had more assets than did the joint stock banks.
 23
Figure 2: Enskilda and Joint Stock Banks Assets, 1869 – 1900 (percentage shares of













































































Joint Stock Banks (incl. Folkbanks)
Sources: Post & Inrikes Tidning 1870-1871, Sammandrag af Bankernas Uppgifter, 1871-1900, Sveriges
Riksbank (1931) pp. 172-185
                                                
21 Flux, A.W. (1910) p. 56, Kindleberger, C.P. (1982) p. 920
22 See Ögren, A. (2003a) Chapter 2.
23 When Parliament initiated these banks, the hope was that they would facilitate the replacement of
Enskilda bank with Riksbank notes. Instead, the filial banks became major distributors of Enskilda bank
notes, see Ögren, A. (2003a) Chapter 2.10
Since commercial banking in general promoted the growth of the real economy, it
can be concluded that this also was the case with the Enskilda banks. There clearly is
little evidence to support the notion that the Enskilda banks were obsolete by the 1870's.
Bank Deposit Financing
If reliance on deposit financing is a measure of bank modernity, then the Enskilda banks
once again pass the test. By 1867, deposits exceeded notes as a source of Enskilda bank
financing.
24 Indeed, Enskilda banks had accepted deposits right from their inception,
although these were originally less import than notes. As demonstrated in Figure 3, until
the turn of the twentieth century total Enskilda bank deposits considerably exceeded
those of the joint stock banks.













































































Total Deposits - Enskilda Banks
Total Deposits - Joint Stock Banks
(incl. Folkbanks)
Sources: Post & Inrikes Tidning 1835-1871, Sammandrag af Bankernas Uppgifter, 1871-1900, Sveriges
Riksbank (1931) pp. 172-185
The low reliance on deposits during the first half of the nineteenth century had its
roots in the modest circulation of means of payment that could be accepted as deposits
which, in turn, increased the importance of the Enskilda bank notes. By initially
financing their activities mainly with notes, the Enskilda banks helped create the
conditions making the utilization of deposits possible.
The 6% legal limit on interest rates has been perceived to be the true obstacle to the
development of a banking system dependent on, or at least willing to utilize, deposits as
a source of funds. Another factor limiting the banks’ ability to attract deposits surely
                                                
24 Ögren, A. (2000) pp. 87-8811
must have been the scarcity of official means of payment. Deposits could only become a
viable alternative source of funds for banks if means of payment more official than
private promissary notes were in circulation. The Enskilda banks’ creation of semi-
official means of payment arguably was more important for the development of a
deposit financed banking system than was the repeal of the usury law.
25
As early as 1859, the volume of Enskilda bank notes in circulation exceeded that of
Riksbank notes, a situation that continued throughout the rest of the nineteenth century.
In 1869, the Riksbank was compelled to accept Enskilda bank notes for deposit at par.
While the share of notes in total Enskilda bank liabilities decreased, the absolute volume
of notes in circulation continued to increase and peaked in 1900.
26 There is no doubt that
the Enskilda banks performed an important service before the 1870's by supplying good
quality means of payment. The question is, were they outdated after the 1870's?
Enskilda Banks and the Liquidity of the Swedish Capital Markets
The study of Swedish monetization has one major omission: the regional variation in
liquidity.
27 There is good reason to believe that while the major cities were reasonably
well supplied with credit and means of payment, peripheral areas still suffered from a
shortage of capital during the 1870's. In this paper it is argued that reliance on deposits
varied geographically. A bank situated in Gothenburg or Stockholm, cities with their
own capital markets, had greater opportunities to attract deposits than did rural banks.
Thus, after 1863, the motive for opening a note issuing bank might be expected to be the
supplying of credit to an area where deposits alone would not do the trick.
A cross section study of the Enskilda banks existing in 1871 supports the hypothesis
that the geographical distance to the principal capital markets affected the ability to
utilize deposits negatively. Each bank’s deposits as a percentage of total liabilities
(DEPOSITS) served as the dependent variable. The sum of the distance in kilometers to
Stockholm and Gothenburg (STHLM+GBG) was used as a proxy for the degree of the
bank’s peripheral location relative to the major liquid capital markets. A dummy
variable (EST60), was included to determine if there was any significant relationship
                                                
25 See Ögren, A. (2003c)
26 See Ögren, A. (2003c) and Ögren, A. (2000) pp. 45-47
27 The overall monetization of Sweden is studied in Ögren, A. (2003c)12
between the bank’s reliance on deposits and how long it had been in business (se
Appendix A for model test results).
Figure 4: Cross Sectional OLS-Regression on Geographical Distance and Bank
Establishments as Determinants on the use of Deposits in 1871.
Dependent Variable: LOG(DEPOSITS)
Sample(adjusted): 2 27
Included observations: 26 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 1.443573 0.990213 1.457841 0.1584
LOG(STHLM+GBG) -0.387038 0.156215 -2.477599 0.0210*
EST60 -0.064223 0.104264 -0.615966 0.5440
R-squared 0.260449    Mean dependent var -1.078272
Adjusted R-squared 0.196140    S.D. dependent var 0.282722
Log likelihood 0.385317    F-statistic 4.049968
Durbin-Watson stat 1.578089    Prob(F-statistic) 0.031127
* Denotes significance at least at 5%
Sources: Sammandrag af Bankernas Uppgifter 1871, Motormännens Riksförbund (1999)
The OLS-regressions indicates a negative relationship between deposits as a
percentage of total assets and a bank’s distance from liquid capital markets. Whether or
not the bank was of recent origin (post 1864), however, did not significantly affect its
reliance on deposits.
Figure 5: Issued Notes, Deposits and Bond Holdings, as Percentages of Total Assets in
1871 and 1881 for Enskilda Banks Established Between 1865 and 1871, Arranged by














HernösandsEB 42% 24% 24% 44% 1% 5% North
SundsvEB 38% 18% 31% 51% 0% 3% North
WesterbEB 35% 20% 21% 46% 0% 4% North
GeflebLEB 32% 17% 39% 57% 3% 5% North
SkarabLEB 31% 13% 44% 56% 0% 3% West
ChristianstEB 30% 19% 38% 48% 2% 7% West
CalmarEB 29% 13% 26% 50% 5% 13% South
Ebi Christineh 28% 15% 23% 37% 0% 5% West
UplandsEB 27% 13% 52% 63% 18% 21% East
EB i Wernersb 26% 16% 37% 41% 3% 4% West
GotlEB 25% 13% 24% 49% 0% 4% South
SödermanlEB 23% 17% 44% 55% 8% 10% East
BohusLEB 21% 16% 23% 47% 0% 5% West
BoråsEB 16% 10% 41% 57% 1% 4% West
All Enskilda banks 27% 16% 39% 53% 7% 9%
Source: Sammandrag af Bankernas Uppgifter 1871, 188113
Figure 5, however, indicates that several Enskilda banks were established in close
proximity to Stockholm and Gothenburg. Thus, although the right to raise funds through
note issuance was most important in peripheral areas of Sweden, such as the northern
parts, it was utilized to some extent by all banks.
Deposit financing differed more among banks in various regions than did note
issuance, but the banks closest to Stockholm and Gothenburg had the most deposits.
The relative importance of notes diminished for all banks between 1871 and 1881, as
increased overall liquidity permitted an increase in deposits. In absolute amounts,
however, notes outstanding continued to increase for all banks.
An additional measure of local market liquidity is the quantity of bonds held by the
banks, since the willingness to hold them ought to increase with the availability of a
liquid secondary market. The fact that the peripheral banks held less bonds, both in
1871 and in 1881, is evidence of the geographically unequal spread of liquidity. Overall,
the increase in total bond holdings during this decade is evidence of growing liquidity
throughout the Country.
Since Enskilda banks were established even in areas where capital scarcity does not
seem to have been an acute problem, the question must be asked why the joint stock
form of organization was not used? Three reasons for establishing Enskilda banks in the
more central areas can be posited: 1) The unlimited liability of Enskilda bank owners
might have increased public confidence, thus making it possible for them to be less
heavily capitalized, 2) The choice of the Enskilda bank format might have been a matter
of path dependence, or 3) Even if capital scarcity in the region was not an acute
problem, the ability to issue notes might have been of initial importance to the new
bank. That is, the issuing notes might have allowed the bank to consolidate its finances
and expand its business faster than otherwise would have been the case.
Furthermore, since the Enskilda banks did not exhaust their issuance quotas, they,
unlike the joint stock banks, could instantly relieve a temporary lack of liquidity by
issuing notes. This fact might explain the willingness of owners to accept the greater
risks of unlimited liability. If the banks promoted economic growth by turning real
assets into liquid credit, then the question becomes: did the development of the Enskilda
banks contribute to the creation of liquid capital markets in Sweden?14
Enskilda banks, Liquid Reserves and the Emergence of Liquid Capital Markets
Above, it was argued that banks make an important contribution to economic growth by
converting illiquid assets into liquid liabilities. Doing so, however, exposes banks to the
danger of runs, in turn forcing them to hold non-interest bearing liquid assets to be able
to meet the demands of depositors and note holders. The more instantly redeemable
liabilities a bank has, the more vulnerable it is to runs, and therefore the more liquid
assets it needs to meet possible liquidity shocks. While more liquid assets reduces the
likelihood of bank failure, however, it also impedes credit creation and, thus, economic
growth.
28 In brief, the level of liquid reserves reflects a trade off between the risk of
bank failure and the demand for credit.
The trust engendered by a banking system, as well as its efficiency, might be
measured in terms of the evolution of its liquid reserves. The level of the banks’ liquid
reserves are an indicator of the public’s fear of bank failures. The less reserves the
banks have to hold, the more efficient they can be in promoting economic growth. The
level of reserves is also related to the state of secondary asset markets. The more liquid
these are, the more the banks can substitute interest bearing, for non-interest bearing,
financial assets, thus further increasing capital market liquidity. The principal goal of
this chapter thus is to analyze the factors that determined the level of liquid reserves
maintained by the Enskilda banks during the period 1834 - 1900.
In order to allow holders of their notes to redeem these in legal tender, the Enskilda
banks were forced to hold cash reserves. Assuming that the banks behaved efficiently,
they would not hold excessive cash reserves. According to free banking theory, the
demand for cash reserves by a bank’s customers has to be satisfied.
29 Thus, legal
limitations on the right to issue notes only provided a framework for the banks’ choices
of reserves. Since the Enskilda banks issued less than their legally permissible quantity
of notes, their effective issue was not limited by rules and regulations, rather it was
limited by the public’s demand that they hold sufficient legal tender.
30 The Enskilda
banks regularly published their balance sheets, providing a high level of transparency of
their situation.
                                                
28 See Diamond, D.W. & Dybvig, P.H. (1983) and Daimond, D.W. & Rajan, R.G. (2001). Diamond and
Rajan also discuss the benefits of banking fragility for economic growth (Daimond, D.W. & Rajan, R.G.
(2001) pp. 287-288).
29 Selgin, G.A. & White, L.H. (1994) p. 1720
30 Ögren, A (2000) pp. 39-4015
The contemporary Swedish debate on banking focused on the question of bank notes.
Critics argued that note issuance threatened both the prudence of the banks and, by
extension, the fixed exchange rate, even though a run on deposits would be just serious
as one on notes.
31 Still, as shown in figure 6, liquid reserves were not as closely linked
to demand deposits as to notes in circulation.
Figure 6: Note Issuance, Demand Deposits and Liquid Reserves of the Enskilda banks,















































































Sources: Post & Inrikes Tidning 1835-1871, Sammandrag af Bankernas Uppgifter 1871-1900
Assuming that the banks were efficient in their choice of liquid reserves, the reserves
actually maintained must have been sufficient in the eyes of the public. Either the
banks’ customers did not consider demand deposits to be a source of bank vulnerability,
or else the demand for liquid reserves declined over time while, co-incidentally, demand
deposits also increased. The former explanation seems unlikely in view of the fact that
Stockholm Enskilda Bank experienced a run on deposits in December of 1878.
32 The
latter explanation would imply a general, over all decrease in the demand for cash
reserves. As shown in figure 7, the overall level of liquid reserves did indeed decline
during the latter part of the period. The question thus becomes why liquid reserves were
allowed to shrink to approximately three percent of total assets by the end of the period?
                                                
31 Ögren, A. (2000) p. 47. As an example, in the early 1860's a tax was imposed on the issuance of notes.
32 Söderlund, E. (1964) pp. 113, 12916














































































Sources: Post & Inrikes Tidning 1835-1871, Sammandrag af Bankernas Uppgifter 1871-1900
The dramatic decline in cash reserves shown in figure 7 might be explained by any
one (or combination) of three hypothesis: 1) Increasing confidence in the banking
system might have decreased the public’s demand for liquid reserve, 2) Increasing
demand for credit might have made it possible for banks to hold smaller liquid reserve,
or 3) Increasing liquidity of the financial market might have it possible for the banks to
substitute interest bearing (e.g. bonds, bills of exchange or shares), for non-interest
bearing, financial assets. Although not likely, it is also possible that the lower liquid
reserves might be the result of an institutional focus on notes. That is, the public was
more concerned with the backing of notes than of other liabilities.
A Bank Specific Model Estimating the Determinants of Liquid Reserves
Before analyzing the structure of assets and liabilities, a qualitative discussion of the
relationships among various types of assets and liabilities and of the banks’ risk profile
is required. The holder of a bank note or a deposit is primarily concerned with his/hers
ability to convert the note into legal tender or to withdraw the deposit. Clearly the
structure of the bank’s assets and liabilities affects this ability.
All the variables are measured relative to total assets (and hence also to liabilities).
Thus, the original series reflect the Enskilda banks’ holdings of various types of assets
and liabilities as percentages of total assets. The series first differences, in turn, reflect
annual percentage changes in these assets and liabilities relative to total assets.17
The dependent variable LIQRES is defined as the banks’ holdings of legal tender
(i.e. specie plus Riksbank notes). Notes of other private banks are not included.
33 These
liquid reserves measure the bank’s ability to instantaneously pay out deposits and to
redeem its notes in legal tender.
Figure 8: Liquid Reserves as a Percentage of Total Assets and Annual Changes in that
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Bank assets can be classified according to their riskiness. This riskiness, of course,
was one reason there was a demand for cash reserves. If all assets were risk free and
could be traded instantaneously, the need for cash reserves would be close to zero. In
other words, the most secure and liquid assets available were legal tender. With regard
to the liabilities of the banks, the following four variables are included in the model:
NOTES and DDEP: Notes in circulation and demand deposits were the most critical
bank liabilities, being subject to instantaneous redemption or withdrawal.
34 Thus, these
two categories of liabilities ought to have played a major role in determining the banks’
preparedness to pay out legal tender. Notes and demand deposits, in relation to total
assets, are thus expected to be positively correlated to the quantity of liquid reserves.
                                                
33 The small share of any Enskilda bank’s notes held by other Enskilda banks indicates both that holding
these notes, rather than converting them to legal tender, was considered unnecessarily risky and, in
addition, of benefit to the issuing, and competing, bank. Each Enskilda bank thus tried to redeem the
notes of all the other Enskilda banks as quickly as possible. These notes, therefore, are not included as
assets in the model.
34 Also included in the category of outstanding notes are other types of bank promissary notes, such as the
so-called bank postal bills, introduced in 1857 to facilitate inter bank clearing, even though legally they
did not have to be backed by reserves.18
Figure 9: Circulating Notes as Percent of Total Assets and Annual Changes in that
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Figure 10: Demand Deposits as Percent of Total Assets and Annual Changes in that
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TDEP: Time deposits, which could be withdrawn between two and six months notice,
could be expected to require less liquid reserves than notes or demand deposits. A
quicker payout, however, would tend to increase public confidence in a bank. Delay
could make customers wonder if the bank was operating prudently. Thus, time deposits
can also be expected to be positively correlated with cash reserves.
Figure 11: Time Deposits as Percent of Total Assets and Annual Changes in that
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EQCAP: The least risky category of bank liabilities was their equity capital. It appeared
on both sides of the balance sheet. On the asset side, the equity capital was divided
between the so called security fund (Grundfondshypotek), which consisted of bonds and
of certain types of stocks and other secure assets and legal tender reserves.
35 The larger
the share of equity capital in total assets, the greater the liquid reserves the bank ought
to be able to maintain.  If the hypothesis that increasing liquidity of capital markets
made it possible for the banks to substitute other financial assets for liquid reserves is
correct, however, then the growth of equity capital ought to have been negatively
related to liquid reserves. That is, banks could hold other financial assets as substitutes
for legal tender.
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NETBANKS: This series consists of assets maintained with other financial institutions
minus the debts to the bank of these institutions. An increase in the net value of these
assets ought to affect liquid reserves negatively.
Figure 13: Net Assets Maintained at Other Financial Institutions as Percent of Total
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35 On the asset side there was the so-called security fund. It was that part of the equity capital which
consisted of shares and bonds rather than liquid reserves. Since it is strongly correlated with equity
capital, it is excluded from the model.20
When studying changes in liquid reserves in response to changes in the banks’
holdings of other assets, there is already a defined relationship since each class of assets
in measured in relation to total assets. Thus, increasing the percentage of one type of
asset inevitable requires an offsetting reduction in other assets.
36 Nonetheless, this is the
basis for determining any systematic relationship between liquid and other types of
assets. For instance, did liquid reserves vary systematically in response to changes in the
holdings of bills of exchange, bonds or stocks?
BONDS & BOE: Interest bearing assets, not part of the banks’ security funds, such as
bonds and bills of exchange, could fluctuate in value.
37 This problem, however,
diminished as the liquidity of secondary markets increased. The relationship between
liquid assets and bonds and bills of exchange, therefore, is an indication of the liquidity
of secondary markets. Holdings of bonds and bills of exchange would be expected to
increase relative to liquid reserves as those assets increasingly came to be viewed as
reliable substitutes for liquid reserves.
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36 One potential problem with performing the regression with the variables being measured relative to
total assets (and, therefore, also to total liabilities) is that the variables are locked into a defined
relationship. As a result the model’s goodness of fit value (R2) is extremely high (92%). Still, there are
two reasons that this problem probably has not biased the results: 1) The independent variables do not
appear to strongly correlated internally (no multicolinearity), and 2) Running an OLS regression with the
independent variables limited to the most important types of liabilities, thus dissolving the defined
relationship to the dependent variable, did not dramatically alter the results. The most noticeable change
was a drop in the value of R2 to a less spectacular, but still impressive, value of 75% (see Appendix B).
37 One example was the bonds issued to finance the construction of private railroads in Sweden, which
rapidly increased in value during the boom years 1870 - 1874. Between 1875 and 1878, however, they
shrank to less than half their nominal value, if any buyer could be found. The crisis of 1878 - 1879 also
demonstrates that a lack of liquidity on secondary asset markets in a small transition economy such as
nineteenth century Sweden could increase the volatility of asset prices, especially during economic
downturns (see Ögren, A. (2003b)).21
Figure 15: Bills of Exchange as Percent of Total Assets and Annual Changes in that
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LEND: Loans were one bank asset that could result in higher levels of risk. The larger
the share of bank assets that consisted of credits, the harder it was to increase liquidity
on short notice. At the same time, the trade off between the public’s demand for credit
and its demand for liquid reserves is built into this parameter. If the hypothesis that
increased demand for credit permitted a shrinkage of liquidity is correct, then the
relationship should be negative.
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One final question concerns the role of institutional change. The Banking Act of
1864 was important in that it reduced the impediments to new banks caused by charter
requirements. It can therefore be seen as a signal of official approval of the Enskilda
bank system which, in turn, might have reflected growing public confidence in these
banks.
38
                                                
38 Ögren, A. (2000) pp. 37-3822
Estimating the Model for Determining the Enskilda Banks’ Liquid Reserves
As noted above, all the variables are measured relative to total bank assets (and thus
also to bank liabilities). This makes the model less sensitive to the number of banks,
which in fact increased substantially during the period. It also gives a better picture of
the trade off between liquid reserves and other types of assets and liabilities faced by the
Enskilda banks than would absolute values. All the series used in the model have been
converted into first differences. So doing makes it possible to test how changes in the
composition of assets and liabilities affected the holdings of liquid reserves in the short
run.
One problem is the small number of banks that existed early in the period. This
increases the sensitivity of the results to the actions of a single bank. In addition, the
growing number of banks changed over all conditions. As can be seen from the graphed
data series, several of the series experienced decreased volatility over time, thus making
the model likely to suffer from heteroskedasticity (see Appendix B for model test
results).
The volatility of the early period (from 1834 until approximately 1857/58) can not be
explained simply by the crises of 1846/47 and 1856/58. The strong effect of these crises
on liquid reserves is most probably explained by the small number of banks in
existence. The eighth Enskilda bank was established in 1848. This number then
remained constant until the founding of Stockholm Enskilda Bank in 1856. Since 1848
was the earliest year for which complete balance sheets for all the banks could be
located, the estimation of the model begins with that year (see figure 17).23




Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.000329 0.001197 -0.274696 0.7848
D(NOTES) 0.374589 0.054964 6.815180 0.0000*
D(DDEP) 0.233642 0.115118 2.029597 0.0485*
D(TDEP) 0.186586 0.070322 2.653305 0.0110*
D(EQCAP) -0.411678 0.067226 -6.123787 0.0000*
D(NETBANKS) -0.354857 0.059962 -5.917981 0.0000*
D(BONDS) -0.654004 0.144980 -4.511005 0.0000*
D(BOE) -0.703533 0.083705 -8.404890 0.0000*
D(LEND) -0.569022 0.065145 -8.734735 0.0000*
R-squared 0.929814    Mean dependent var -0.004021
Adjusted R-squared 0.917052    S.D. dependent var 0.026099
Log likelihood 188.9324    F-statistic 72.86266
Durbin-Watson stat 2.076707    Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
* Denotes at least 5% significance level
Sources: Post & Inrikes Tidning 1849 – 1871, Sammandrag af Bankernas Uppgifter, 1871-1871-1900,
Sveriges Riksbank (1931) pp. 172-185
The most general result of the model, displayed in figure 17, is that changes in each
of the independent variables affected, at the 5% significance level, the liquid reserves
held by the banks.
39 Since all the variables are measured relative to total assets, it is also
possible to interpret the size of the coefficients. Recall that the original, undifferenced
series represent the particular asset or liability as a percentage of total assets or
liabilities. Thus differentiating the series causes the changes in this relationship to be
measured in percentage terms.
The coefficients of the model imply that an increase in notes in circulation of one
percentage point, say from twenty to twenty one percent of total assets, resulted in an
increase of liquid reserves equal to 0.37 percent of total assets. Therefore, it can be
maintained that the relative volume of notes in circulation had a greater effect on liquid
reserves than did the relative volume of demand deposits. As expected, the banks also
were forced to increase their liquid reserves more in response to an increase in demand,
than in time, deposits. This difference, however, was smaller than expected.
                                                
39 The R-square, or explanatory power, of the model is 93 percent. For a model utilizing differenced series
that value is quite high, although that is not surprising given that the variables have a defined endogenous
relationship among themselves. Still, it is sufficient to conclude that the model largely includes the
existing trade offs between liquid reserves and other assets, as well as the effect of various liabilities on
the need for liquid reserves.24
The fact that an increasing share of the equity capital was held in the form of interest
bearing financial assets instead of cash reserves supports the hypothesis that the
increasing liquidity of the financial markets made it possible for the banks to substitute
bonds and shares for more liquid assets. A one percentage point increase in the share of
equity capital resulted in a 0.41 percentage point decrease in liquid reserves. In absolute
numbers, however, both the level of equity capital and that of liquid reserves increased.
There is good reason to believe that interest bearing financial assets, such as bonds
and bills of exchange, increasingly were substituted for liquid reserves. These assets
could not totally replace liquid reserves, but the decrease in the share of liquid reserves
of between 0.65 and 0.70 percentage points in response to a one percentage point
increase in bonds or bills of exchange is quite striking. Also note that these bonds do not
include any that might be held as part of the banks’ security funds. In the next section,
the hypothesis that the increased liquidity of the secondary markets for financial assets
made it possible to substitute such assets for liquid reserves, will be examined further.
The lending co-efficient also indicates that the increasing demand for credit was
partly accommodated by a growing public acceptance of a lower level of liquid
reserves. If lending increased by one percentage point of total assets, this permitted a
decrease in liquid reserves of more than half a percentage point. The variable
NETBANKS simply reflects that when the banks were net creditors vis a vis other
financial institutions, lower liquid reserves were needed.
Whether or not relaxing the rules for establishing new banks influenced the holding
of liquid reserves remains an open question. The hypothesis was that increased public
confidence in the banking system ought to have permitted a reduction in liquid reserves,
and that the Banking Act of 1864 reflected such an increase in confidence. Chow
breakpoint tests for the years 1864 and 1865 are significant at the ten percent
significance level (see Appendix B).
A Model Estimating the Determinants of Enskilda Bank Bond Holdings
The previous section indicates that there is reason to believe that the banks experienced
an increased ability to exchange interest bearing financial assets for liquid reserves. This
might well have been the result of increased liquidity on the growing secondary
financial market. Such a process would be consistent with a model of banks and
financial markets in transitional economies created by Douglas W. Diamond. Diamond
argues that the banks play an active role in creating liquid secondary markets. As capital25
markets become increasingly liquid, banks can reduce their holdings of fully mature
assets. That is, liquid capital markets allow banks to reduce their holdings of liquid
assets, thus, in turn, further increasing capital market liquidity.
40
The hypothesis that Sweden benefited from increasingly liquid capital markets is
further supported by the increasing ability of the National Debt Office to place bonds on
the domestic market. In 1861, the Office issued bonds underwritten by three actors on
the Swedish credit market.  In order to generate domestic demand for these bonds, they
(and their interest coupons) were made acceptable for all types of tax payments. In
addition, they could be transferred to third parties at no cost. In effect, these bonds had
been given legal tender status, clearly indicating that the secondary financial asset
market suffered from a lack of liquidity. The coupon interest rate was a reasonable
4.5%, but in addition a commission (or capital discount) of 7% had to be paid to the
underwriters of the loan. In view of the problems encountered in selling the bonds
outside the major cities, a further 2% commission was added for such sales. In 1865
another, supposedly temporary, loan to be administered by a Swedish bank was planned
for the domestic credit market.  Not only did it have to be denominated in Mark
Hamburg Banko and Cologne Silver, the interest rate required was a generous 6%, with
another 3.5% in total commissions.
Less than ten years later, in 1870 and 1872, two significantly larger bond loans were
placed on the Swedish market. This time, no middle man was required and the interest
rates were 5% and 4% respectively. In addition the commissions were lower. The
second of these loans was designated to pay off the first, as well as two international
bond loans dating from 1868 and 1869. Even if swings in the business cycle played
some role, the domestic bond market seems to have become more liquid during these
years.
41
In this section, a model determining the variables affecting Enskilda bank holdings of
bonds relative to total assets is estimated. The two hypothesis are: 1) Increasing over all
liquidity made bonds a better substitute for liquid assets, and 2) If bonds are viewed as a
                                                
40 Diamond, D.W. (1997) pp. 949-950. Diamond suggests that the model is particularly suitable for a
developing economy, which Sweden at the time most certainly was.
41 RGKLKT. Administering the 1861 loan were the Banking firms Carnegie o Co., C.G. Cervin and
Stockholm Enskilda Bank. Administering the 1865 loan was Skandinaviska Kreditaktiebolaget in
Gotheburg. A Professor from the Institute of Technology had to help the national Debt Office with
calculating the actual cost of the loan. In the case of the 1870 and 1872 loan, commission was probably
paid to local tax governors administering the handling of these bonds (see also Ögren, A. (2003b)).26
substitute for liquid assets, then increased demand for credit ought to affect relative
bond holdings negatively.
Since this model is intended to explain long term developments, the dependent
variable, BONDS, is measured as the natural logarithm of bank holdings of bonds,
exclusive of their security fund, in relation to total assets. As was the case with the
previous model, the starting year is 1848.
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Independent variables explaining the share of bonds in total Enskilda bank holdings
are: M3: The money supply in terms of M3 (circulating notes plus the public’s deposits
in commercial and savings banks) is used as a parameter to measure the growth of
liquidity in Sweden.
42 The hypothesis is that growth in M3 ought to lead to increased
Enskilda bank bond holdings. Since the natural logarithm of M3 is not stationary, it has
to be implemented as first differences.
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42 Data is from Post & Inrikes Tidning 1849-1871, Sammandrag af Bankernas Uppgifter 1871-1900, SCB
(1960) pp. 99, 102-103, Sveriges Riksbank (1931) pp. 45-49.27
GDP: Nominal GDP is utilized as a proxy for the public’s demand for credit.
43 If bonds
were considered to be a substitute for liquid reserves, then increased demand for credit
(as measured by GDP growth) ought to be negatively related to bond holdings. As was
the case with M3, the nominal GDP series has to be differenced to become stationary.
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LEND: If bonds were considered to be a substitute for liquid reserves, then Enskilda
bank lending relative to total assets ought to negatively related to bond holdings.
According to the ADF-test, the lending series is actually more stationary in its original,
than in its logarithmic, form. Thus the series LEND is defined simply as lending as a
share of total assets, even though this series is only close to being stationary at the 5%
significance level (see Appendix C).
Figure 21: Enskilda Bank Lending as Percentage of Total Assets and as a Natural
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43 The series of GDP at current prices has been gathered from Krantz, O. (1997) pp. 12-14. One possible
complication is that the growth of GDP might have been impeded by a lack of credit. Thus GDP would
reflect the lack of supply of, as well as the level of demand for, credit. Even though the supply of
commercial bank credit initially only equaled one half percent of GDP, rising to over 40 percent in 1913,
however, the relationship in absolute numbers between GDP at current prices and the supply of credit is
close to linear (the correlation coefficient is 0.94, significant at the 1% level). Krantz, O. (1997) pp. 12-
14, Sveriges Riksbank (1931) pp. 172-185.28
Finally, Enskilda bank holdings of bonds lagged one year was included in the model.
It was expected that bond holdings would be positively related to bond holdings lagged
one year, since the ability to substitute bonds for liquid reserves was increasing over
time.
As was the case with the previous model, one question concerns the existence of a
structural break point either in 1864 or in 1865. Dealing with Swedish monetization
indicates that there was a structural break in the late 1860's which ought to have
increased the ability to substitute bonds for liquid reserves.
44
Estimating the Model Determining Enskilda Bank Bond Holdings
An OLS-regression on the model for the years 1848 through 1900, gave the results
presented in figure 3.22 (for tests of the model, see Appendix C).





Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.489785 0.203332 -2.408797 0.0199
DLOG(M3) 1.388260 0.402205 3.451620 0.0012*
DLOG(GDP) -1.064474 0.541654 -1.965229 0.0552(*)
LEND -2.166584 0.595783 -3.636532 0.0007*
LOG(BONDS(-1)) 0.552661 0.085126 6.492282 0.0000*
R-squared 0.828695     Mean dependent var -2.929539
Adjusted R-squared 0.814420     S.D. dependent var 0.391197
Log likelihood 21.79811     F-statistic 58.05068
Durbin-Watson stat 1.737505     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
* Denotes at least 5% significance level, (*) is close
Sources: Krantz, O. (1997) pp. 12-14, Post & Inrikes Tidning 1849 – 1871, Sammandrag af Bankernas
Uppgifter, 1871-1900, SCB (1960) pp. 99, 102-103, Sveriges Riksbank (1931) pp. 172-185
The results of estimating the model seem to be consistent both with the hypothesis
that interest bearing bonds increasingly become a reliable substitute for liquid reserves
and the hypothesis that this was a consequence of the increased liquidity of the
secondary financial markets.
45
                                                
44 See also Ögren, A. (2003c)
45 The R-square, or explanatory power, is 83 percent. While not high for time series analysis, it is clearly
sufficient to conclude that the model captures the determinants of Enskilda bank bond holdings quite
well.29
Increases in domestic liquidity, as measured by the growth of M3, resulted in larger
bond holdings. Since the growth of economy wide liquidity facilitated the conversion of
bonds into liquid assets, this result is in accord with the hypothesis. Since both the
dependent and the independent variable are natural logarithms, it is also possible to
evaluate the size of the coefficients. A one percent change in economy wide liquidity
resulted in a 1.38 percentage point increase in the share of bonds in total bank assets.
Increases in both lending and the demand for credit, the latter represented by annual
changes in nominal GDP, resulted in decreased Enskilda bank bond holdings (although
the GDP relationship was not significant at the 5% level). These results tend to support
the hypothesis that bonds were held as substitutes for liquid reserves since both strictly
cash reserves and bond holdings decreased when the demand for credit increased.
The percentage of bonds in total bank assets was positively related to bonds held the
previous year. This is likely to be the result of an increasing ability over time to
substitute interest bearing bonds for liquid reserves, as the liquidity of secondary asset
markets improved. A discontinuity in the ability to hold financial assets in place of cash
reserves indicates that the secondary markets for such assets had become sufficiently
liquid to assure the holder that they could be sold with little risk of substantial loss. One
way to test if and when such a break occurred is to apply the Chow breakpoint test on
the model.
Figure 23: Chow Breakpoint tests of the model for the years 1864 & 1865
Chow Breakpoint Test: 1864
F-statistic 4.085446     Probability 0.004015*
Log likelihood ratio 20.60074     Probability 0.000963
Chow Breakpoint Test: 1865
F-statistic 5.037635     Probability 0.001014*
Log likelihood ratio 24.43676     Probability 0.000179
* Denotes at least 5% significance level
The Chow breakpoint tests for the years 1864 and 1865 also are significant at the 5%
significance level, indicating that a structural change in the ability hold bonds probably
occurred during these years. The high level of significance for year 1865, when the
establishment of new banks accelerated in response to the Banking Act of 1864,
supports the hypothesis that the right to freely open new banks facilitated the
development of the Swedish credit market. Thus the 1860's, thanks to the evolution of
the banking system, witnessed significant progress in the creation of the prerequisites
needed for the development of an efficient over all capital market.30
Conclusions
To paraphrase Mark Twain; the rumors concerning the death of the Enskilda banks in
response to the introduction of joint stock banking during the 1860's are exaggerated.
The Enskilda banks continued to dominate Swedish banking until the dawn of the
twentieth century. Given the commercial banking system’s undoubted contribution to
economic growth, the Enskilda banks might well have been an optimum response, given
the state of the economy and the existing institutional setting. The aspect of the Enskilda
banks used to brand them as backward, the issuance of notes, in fact was the source of
their success.
The ability to issue notes gave the Enskilda banks a degree of flexibility that made it
possible for them to operate in areas of capital scarcity. The use of deposit financing
developed not so much because of the repeal of the usury law in 1863, but because of
the provision of sufficient means of payment. The circulation of money, usable for
deposits, was largely a result of the note issuance activities of the Enskilda banks.
As deposits increasingly become a viable alternative means of financing banking
activity, the Enskilda banks came largely to rely on them. By the late 1860's, note
issuance had become secondary to deposits. Indeed, throughout the nineteenth century,
the Enskilda banks held more deposits than did the joint stock banks. One of the
advantages of the Enskilda banks versus their joint stock competitors was their greater
ability to liquify fixed assets, even when they lacked sufficient deposits to operate their
business. Arguably, this advantage was maintained throughout the nineteenth century
and made the Enskilda banks’ mode of operation superior in most parts of Sweden.
The latter section in this chapter examined the interaction between the Enskilda
banks and the emergence of liquid capital markets. The level of liquid reserves
maintained by the Enskilda banks declined rapidly during the period 1834-1900. Three
explanatory hypotheses were discussed: 1) Increasing confidence in the banking system
resulted in a decreased demand for liquid reserves, 2) Increasing demand for credit by
the public resulted in a decreased demand for liquid reserves and 3) Increasing liquidity
of capital markets allowed the Enskilda banks to substitute income generating assets,
such as bonds and shares, for non-interest bearing cash reserves.
All three hypotheses seem to have some validity, even if the confidence effect is
difficult to measure. Liquid reserves definitely decreased as demand for credit rose, and
bond holdings were strongly negatively related to totally liquid reserves. As Enskilda
bank bond holding increased in tandem with the economy’s overall liquidity, growing31
capital markets made it possible to substitute interest bearing assets for liquid reserves.
Thus, as the liquidity of capital markets increased as a result of banking activities, the
banks needed less liquid reserves, thereby further increasing the liquidity of the markets.
The years 1864 and 1865 witnessed a leap upward in the bond holdings of the
Enskilda banks, implying a breakthrough for Swedish capital markets. The conclusion
of this paper is that the Banking Act of 1864, by removing virtually all legal barriers to
the establishment of new banks, was of greater importance for the development and
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Appendix – Testing the Models
Appendix A – Testing the OLS-Regression determining the use of Deposits (Cross
Sectional )
Since this model is cross sectional all banks have been sorted in an alphabetic order.
Thus, the series are assumed to be stationary (and are so when tested with the ADF-
test).




Included observations: 26 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 1.443573 0.990213 1.457841 0.1584
LOG(STHLM+GBG) -0.387038 0.156215 -2.477599 0.0210
EST60 -0.064223 0.104264 -0.615966 0.5440
R-squared 0.260449    Mean dependent var -1.078272
Adjusted R-squared 0.196140    S.D. dependent var 0.282722
S.E. of regression 0.253483    Akaike info criterion 0.201129
Sum squared resid 1.477837    Schwarz criterion 0.346294
Log likelihood 0.385317    F-statistic 4.049968
Durbin-Watson stat 1.578089    Prob(F-statistic) 0.031127

















































Mean      9.59E-16
Median   0.015450
Maximum   0.515031
Minimum -0.414830
Std. Dev.    0.243133
Skewness    0.031897
Kurtosis    2.496692
Jarque-Bera  0.278838
Probability  0.869863
As seen in the figure above, the residuals are normally distributed, and this allows for
further testing of the model.
Appendix Figure 3: Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test
F-statistic 0.381390    Probability 0.687546
Obs*R-squared 0.911294    Probability 0.63403835
As seen above, the model goes clear from the problem of serial correlation, and as the
model is made using cross sectional data (no time series) this is expected.
Appendix Figure 4: White Heteroskedasticity Test (Including Cross Terms)
F-statistic 0.674197    Probability 0.617285
Obs*R-squared 2.958902    Probability 0.564726
Heteroskedasticity (a systematic pattern of volatility in values) is seldom a problem
using cross sectional data. And this test shows that this was not a problem for the
model.
Appendix Figure 5: Ramsey RESET Test (general stability and specification test)
F-statistic 0.059878     Probability 0.808957
Log likelihood ratio 0.070669     Probability 0.790365
Appendix B – testing the OLS model determining liquidity reserves (time series)






Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.000329 0.001197 -0.274696 0.7848
D(NOTES) 0.374589 0.054964 6.815180 0.0000
D(DDEP) 0.233642 0.115118 2.029597 0.0485
D(TDEP) 0.186586 0.070322 2.653305 0.0110
D(EQCAP) -0.411678 0.067226 -6.123787 0.0000
D(NETBANKS) -0.354857 0.059962 -5.917981 0.0000
D(BONDS) -0.654004 0.144980 -4.511005 0.0000
D(BOE) -0.703533 0.083705 -8.404890 0.0000
D(LEND) -0.569022 0.065145 -8.734735 0.0000
R-squared 0.929814    Mean dependent var -0.004021
Adjusted R-squared 0.917052    S.D. dependent var 0.026099
S.E. of regression 0.007517    Akaike info criterion -6.789900
Sum squared resid 0.002486    Schwarz criterion -6.455322
Log likelihood 188.9324    F-statistic 72.86266
Durbin-Watson stat 2.076707    Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
All series, except for NETBANKS, are un-stationary when not differenced. The series
NETBANKS is stationary at a 5 percent significance level, and hence can be
implemented in the model as it is. But, as all other variables are set as annual changes in36
relation to total assets or liabilities, this is also chosen for this variable so that it can be
interpretated in the same manner as all other independent variables.
Appendix Figure 7: ADF-test NETBANKS, intercept and no lags
ADF Test Statistic -3.113860     1%   Critical Value* -3.5312
    5%   Critical Value -2.9055
    10% Critical Value -2.5899
Appendix Figure 8:  Distribution of Residuals, Histogram Normality Test on the Time

























































Mean     -1.87E-18
Median -0.000965
Maximum   0.014808
Minimum -0.015565
Std. Dev.    0.006914
Skewness    0.084521
Kurtosis    2.405375
Jarque-Bera  0.843922
Probability  0.655760
Appendix Figure 9: Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test
F-statistic 0.139145     Probability 0.710965
Obs*R-squared 0.170951     Probability 0.679268
As seen above, the model goes clear from the problem of serial correlation, and as the
first differentiate of all variables are used this is expected. A change in the dependent
variable LIQRES, should not be dependent on changes in this variable in the foregoing
year.
Appendix Figure 10: White Heteroskedasticity Test (including cross-terms)
F-statistic 1.437783     Probability 0.306590
Obs*R-squared 47.05016     Probability 0.348761
It was earlier mentioned that heteroskedasticity was an expected problem of the model.
And to some extent it probably was. The test, however, indicates that it is not corrupting
the model, perhaps a result of the fact that the model starts in 1848.37
Appendix Figure 11: Ramsey RESET Test (general stability and specification test)
F-statistic 1.570622     Probability 0.216889
Log likelihood ratio 1.901366     Probability 0.167926
The Ramsey RESET test shows that even though the p-value is not that high, it is
sufficient to exclude the problems of missing variables, model specification and serial
correlation.
Appendix Figure 12:Testing for multicolinearity (Correlations between independent
variables)
DBOE DBONDS DDDEP DEQ CAP DLEND DNOTES DTDEP DNET BANKS
DBOE 1.00 0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.34 0.00 0.39 -0.05
DBONDS 0.09 1.00 0.38 -0.41 -0.49 0.22 -0.05 0.19
DDDEP -0.08 0.38 1.00 -0.26 -0.16 0.08 -0.21 0.06
DEQCAP -0.09 -0.41 -0.26 1.00 -0.03 -0.53 -0.10 0.19
DLEND -0.34 -0.49 -0.16 -0.03 1.00 -0.13 0.06 -0.54
DNOTES 0.00 0.22 0.08 -0.53 -0.13 1.00 -0.23 0.12
DTDEP 0.39 -0.05 -0.21 -0.10 0.06 -0.23 1.00 -0.01
DNETBANKS -0.05 0.19 0.06 0.19 -0.54 0.12 -0.01 1.00
One problem that could be experienced, especially as all variables already are
interlinked through the definition of balance sheets, are that the independent variables
could be suffering from mulitcolinearity. When viewing the correlation between annual
changes in the independent variables, multicolinearity was not detected.
Appendix Figure 13: Chow Breakpoint tests of the model for the years 1864 & 1865
Chow Breakpoint Test: 1864
F-statistic 1.961591     Probability 0.074773
Log likelihood ratio 21.64521     Probability 0.010074
Chow Breakpoint Test: 1865
F-statistic 1.904044     Probability 0.083952
Log likelihood ratio 21.12131     Probability 0.01212338
Appendix Figure 14: Complete readout from the Time Series OLS Regression





Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.002252 0.002028 -1.110731 0.2722
D(NOTES) 0.729477 0.061884 11.78789 0.0000
D(DDEP) 0.686631 0.166980 4.112049 0.0002
D(TDEP) 0.249116 0.097206 2.562764 0.0136
D(LBANKS) 0.479656 0.111262 4.311054 0.0001
R-squared 0.768498 Mean dependent var -0.004021
Adjusted R-squared 0.749206 S.D. dependent var 0.026099
S.E. of regression 0.013070 Akaike info criterion -5.747410
Sum squared resid 0.008200 Schwarz criterion -5.561533
Log likelihood 157.3064 F-statistic 39.83535
Durbin-Watson stat 2.279469 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
The OLS-regression above shows that the model original model (figure 17) was not
corrupted by the inclusion of assets in the model (even though these are defined in
relation to the dependent variable, liquid reserves).
Appendix C – testing the OLS model determining Bond holdings (time series)






Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.489785 0.203332 -2.408797 0.0199
DLOG(M3) 1.388260 0.402205 3.451620 0.0012
DLOG(GDP) -1.064474 0.541654 -1.965229 0.0552
LEND -2.166584 0.595783 -3.636532 0.0007
LOG(BONDS(-1)) 0.552661 0.085126 6.492282 0.0000
R-squared 0.828695    Mean dependent var -2.929539
Adjusted R-squared 0.814420    S.D. dependent var 0.391197
S.E. of regression 0.168524    Akaike info criterion -0.633891
Sum squared resid 1.363213    Schwarz criterion -0.448014
Log likelihood 21.79811    F-statistic 58.05068
Durbin-Watson stat 1.737505    Prob(F-statistic) 0.00000039
Appendix Figure 16: ADF-test for stationarity of series Log(BONDS) & LEND
ADF Test Statistic -6.657701    1%   Critical Value* -3.5457
For series LOG(BONDS)     5%   Critical Value -2.9118
    10% Critical Value -2.5932
ADF Test Statistic -2.898698    1%   Critical Value* -3.5312
For series LEND     5%   Critical Value -2.9055
    10% Critical Value -2.5899
Appendix Figure 17: Distribution of Residuals, Histogram Normality Test on the Time
























































Mean     -3.90E-17
Median   0.017068
Maximum   0.432060
Minimum -0.338813
Std. Dev.    0.161912
Skewness   -0.084762
Kurtosis    3.080188
Jarque-Bera  0.077664
Probability  0.961912
Appendix Figure 18: Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:
F-statistic 0.585383     Probability 0.448035
Obs*R-squared 0.651992     Probability 0.419401
Appendix Figure 19: : White Heteroskedasticity Test (including cross-terms)
F-statistic 1.261033     Probability 0.288173
Obs*R-squared 9.885290     Probability 0.273170
Appendix Figure 20: Ramsey RESET Test (general stability and specification test)
F-statistic 0.132356     Probability 0.717633
Log likelihood ratio 0.149043     Probability 0.699452
Appendix Figure 21: Testing for multicolinearity (Correlations between independent
variables)
DLOGM3 DLOGGDP LEND LOGBONDLAG
DLOGM3  1.000000  0.484658 -0.457045  0.283169
DLOGGDP  0.484658  1.000000 -0.152426  0.176362
LEND -0.457045 -0.152426  1.000000 -0.489657
LOGBONDLAG  0.283169  0.176362 -0.489657  1.000000
Appendix Figure 22: Chow Breakpoint tests of the model for the years 1864 & 1865
Chow Breakpoint Test: 1864
F-statistic 4.085446     Probability 0.004015
Log likelihood ratio 20.60074     Probability 0.000963
Chow Breakpoint Test: 1865
F-statistic 5.037635     Probability 0.001014
Log likelihood ratio 24.43676     Probability 0.000179